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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STEVEN U. HEALEY,

Plaintif{-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.

EARL N. DORIUS, Director,

Driver License Division,
State of Utah,
Defendant-Appellant.

J
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\1ENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns the legality of a driver's license revocation by the appellant under Utah's Implied
Consent Law, Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44.10 (1953), as
amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On l\Iarch 13, 1972, the appellant revoked respon<lent' s driver's license for a period of one year effective
February 9, 1972, for respondent's alleged failure to
submit to a sobriety test under Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-44.10 ( 1953}, as amended. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act, respondent sought a trial de novo

2
in the District Court in and for Salt Lake County for
a determination of whether respondent's driver's Iicense was subject to revocation under the circumstances.
The case was heard before the IIonornble Ernest F.
Baldwin, .Tr., on l\Iay 2, l!J7~ ..Judge lfaldwin found
that "petitioner did in fact constructively refuse to take
a chemical test as required hy 41-6-44'.lO(c), U.C.A.
( 1953) but that such refusal was not without reasonable cause" . . . ( R. 6). There are no findings of fact
or conclusions of law of record in the proceeding and
no order other than that signed by Judge Baldwin on
June 29, 1972 (R. 6). Basecl on the above order, Judge
Baldwin ordered the respondent's license restored to him
by setting aside the revocation of appellant dated l\farch '
!

13, 1972.

RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a re,·ersal of the lower court's
order restoring the respondent's driver's license and
. seeks an order affirming the appellant's order of revocation.
STATEl\IEN'T OF' FACTS
On December 28, 1971, at approximately 2:07 a.m.,
Officer Linden J. Roherts, a l\Iurray City Police Officer, stopped and arrested the respondent, Steven U.
IIealey (Tr. 9) and advised the respondent of his rights
under the Implied Consent Law (Tr. 10). The respondent said he would like to consult with his attorney

a
(Tr. 10) and the officer and respondent went to the
:Murray City Police Station. Respondent called his attorney, .l\Ir. 'i\T endell P. Ables, Esq., in the presence of
Officer Roberts and Officer Gary Reid (Tr. 2, 3, 15,
Hi) who was prepared to administer the "breathalyzer"
test to respondent. (Tr. 2, IO) Officer Roberts reported
that the respondent was advised by his attorney not to
take the test unless he (the attorney for respondent)
was present at the time he was taking the test at the
station. (Tr. 12) Officer Roberts told the respondent
that it was his understanding that it was not necessary
for his attorney to be present, just that he he advised
to either take the test or not take the test and that he
should call his attorney back. The respondent called
l\lr. Ables again at which time Officer Roberts talked
to Mr. Ables and l\lr. Ables said to Officer Roberts,
"'\V ell, I'm advising him not to take it unless I'm
present.' " Ile says, "'I'm not advising him not to take
the test, no!' " I-le says, " 'But I'm just saying, 'Don't
... he ... 'I don't want him to take that test unless I'm
present there.' " (Tr. 13). This was approximately one
hour since arrest. (Tr. 13) Respondent's attorney said
it wou]d take him one hour to get to the station due to
personal reasons (Tr. 13). Officer Roberts advised respondent and respondent's attorney that by the time
another hour went by his evidence of intoxication would
have evaporated or diminished (Tr. 13). There was
dispute in the record as to whether the attorney wanted
to he there when the test was taken (Tr. 13) or just to
talk to the respondent personally before taking any test

(Tr. 16, 17, 18, 22, 23). The refusal was filed out at
approximately 3:20 a.m., (Tr. 14), an hour and thirteen
minutes approximately from time of arrest. l\1r. Ables
did not talk to the respondent thereafter nor did he come
to the l\lurray City Police Station, nor did respondent
ask to call any other attorney.
On cross-examination, Officer Roberts stated that
the respondent said, " 'I'm not refusing to take the test,
because I'll take the test if my attorney's present.'"
(Tr. 19, 22)
l\Ir. Ables then testified that he would not advise
his client on confidential matters over the phone (Tr.
24) and he wanted to talk to him personally. (Tr. 3)
The respondent's attorney's contention is "that I
have a right to consult with him (respondent) in person . . . and not go through a police switchboard on
matters that are privileged and confidential .... " (Tr.
3)

Absent findings of record, the appellant looks to
the transcript for the findings of the lower court. One
such (Tr. 30) is whether, "when a ma11 is under arrest
and he consults his attorney, and that atton1ey tells him,
"Don't take the test until I get there", is that "reasonable cause" to refuse to take it until he gets there? Another is what is meant by "reasonable cause"? (Tr. 31),
to refuse. A third contention of the Court was that the
appellant has the burden of proving that respondent
"did not have a reasonable cause to submit to the test."
(Tr. 32).
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A fourth, that there is a distinguishable shade of
interpretation between "a reasonable cause not to submit" and a "reasonahle cause to follow counsel's advise." The court concludes (Tr. 34) that "he (responclent) did not submit to the test, but that his refusal
to submit, or his failure to submit was based upon advice of counsel, and, therefore, that he had reasonable
cause not to submit. ... " (Tr. 34).
The court then reiterates (Tr. 35):
THE COURT: I will find that he did not submit to the test, and he did not submit upon advice of
counsel, and would not su bruit until counsel a-rrived,
anrl counsel indicated counsel would not arrive for one
hour, and only that, his statements that he would not
s11hrnit until counsel was there-it was just and reasonable cause.
I must take the implication, if you have a right to
counsel. that it's only reasonable that you will follow
counsel's advice ....
THE COURT: As I say, I see nothing wrong
with anything in the Officer's conduct, and I have to
say this man didn't act unreasonably, because he was toUl
what to do." (Emphasis ours.)
1

Respondent was fully aware that his refusal to submit to one of the tests could result in the revocation of
his license for one year. Cl'r. 10)~ (Tr. 14, 20}. Respondent's attorney was likewise aware of this fact.
(T~ 14,20,29,23).
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BACKGROUND
This is no doubt in the hope of curbing the tremenclous increases in drunken driving and to help overcome many of the evidentiary difficulties in provi11g
sueh intoxication, the legislatures in Utah and several
other states have enacted implied consent laws requiring persons to ~ubmit to breath, blood, urine or saliva
tests or Jose their license for refusing to do so. 62A
Conf'>olidated Laws of New York, Article 31 § 1194; 7
North Dakota Century Code :39-20 Chemical Test for
Intoxication: Implied Consent; Utah Code Annotated
41-6-44.10. These laws have been discussed rather widely in Law Review articles throughout the country and
in the American Law Heports. 18 Albanq L.Rev. 203;
17 Albany L.Rev. 258; ~31 l\Iich. L.Rev. 1195; 44 l\Iinn
L.Rev. 673; 35 Tex. L.Rev. 813; 88 A.L.R.2d 1064.
As the laws presently stand, two requisites are es·
sential to validify the revocation of a license. These are:
( 1) The requirement of an appropriate invita·
· tion to take the test, including

( 2)

the prerequisite :in-est,

(b) sufficient p1·obable cause to consider the in·
vitee to he intoxicated, and
( c) an appropriate opportunity to select the test
to be applied if, as in Utah, such privilege is available;
and

( 2) the refusal, either expressed or implied, must
be communicated to, or reasonably presumed by, the in·
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viting officer. (See Ringwood vs. State, 8 U.2d 287,
333 P.2d 943 (Utah 1959)) See also: Timm v. State,

no

N.W.2d 359, (N.D. 1961).

The relevant wording of Section 41-6-44.10,
U.C.A., is as follows:
(a) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test of his breath or
blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, provided that such
test is administered at the dir~ction of a peace
officer having reasonable grounds to believe ·
such person to have been driving in an intoxicated condition. The arresting officer shall determine within reason which of the afore said
tests shall be administered . . . ( c) If such
person has been placed under arrest and has
thereafter been requested to submit to any one
of the chemical tests, provided for in subsections (a) or ( b) of this section and refuses to
submit to such chemical test, the test shall not
be given and the arresting officer shall advise
the person of his rights under this section.
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ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
THE PEACE OFFICER IN TIIE INSTANT CASE Ali'TER ARRESTING THE
RESPONDENT AND GIVING IIIl\1 HIS APPROI~HJATE 'VARNINGS HAD REASONA'BLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE RESPONDENT "rAs INTOXICATED.
According to the record, Officer Linden J. Roberts
placed respondent in the patrol car and under arrest and
then warned respondent of his rights. As indicated in
the testimony of Officer Roberts and counsel for respondent stipulated, there was reasonable cause for arrest, the respondent drove his car at an extremely high
rate of speed, sidewashed down the road, and straddled
the white line down the middle of the road. (Tr. 9)

POINT II
TIIE RESPONDENT 'VAS G I V E N
AJ\lPLE. OPPORTUNITY TO SUJJl\ll'f TO
HIS CIIOICE OF TlIE OFFERED SOBRIETY
TESTS.
The record contains invitations from Officer
Roberts for the respondent to submit to one of the tests.
The respondent and his counsel knew that his refusal
could, according to the statutory language read to him,
result in the revocation of his license on that basis alone
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(Tr. 14). The refusal to submit to a sobriety test was
sufficient in and of itself to justify revocation. In
Prucha v. Department of "JJf otor V chicles, 172 N eh.
415, 110 N.\V. 2d 75 (1961) the court held that the revocation was not arbitrary and capricious because of the
fact than an acquittal of a criminal charge had no bearing on the provisions of the law separate and distinct
from criminal statutes. Prucha v. Dept. of "IJ;Jotor Ve·
hicles, supra; also Combes v. Kelly, 2 l\Iisc. 2d 591, 152
N. Y.S. 2d 943 ( 1956); Anderson v. Macduff, 208 :Misc.
271, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 257 (1955).

POINT III
RESPONDENT'S REFUSAL TO DECIDE
\VHETIIER OR NOT TO SUBMIT TO A REQUIRED CHE~IICAL TEST UNDER U.C.A.
41-G-44.10 AS Al\IENDED UNTIL A PERSONAL
CONFEUENCE \VITII ATTORNEY IS NOT
"REASON ABLE CAUSE" NOT TO SUBl\IIT,
IF Tll\IE OF PERSONAL CONFERENCE IS
SO FAR REl\IOVED AS TO RENDER POTENTIALLY OBTAINABLE TEST RESULTS
l\IEANINGLESS.
A main question for review by this court is: Is
reasonably following advice of attorney, (whether reasonable or unreasonable) reasonable cause to refuse to
submit to a sobriety test, and therefore sufficient to
excuse the taking of said test?

IO
There can be no dispute of facts that respondent
did ref use to decide to take the sobriety test until his
attorney could personally come to the :Murray City
Police Station and talk to him. There is likewise no
dispute that the respondent talked to his attorney twice
from the station on the phone, and consulted with him
and that by the time the attorney could get to the station (by his estimate) two hours plus from the time of
arrest would have elapsed, which time, the officer considered to be too late in time for the breathalyzer test.
There was no evidence at trial to refute the officer's
opinion that any results then obtained would essentially
be useless.
The advise of respondent's attorney was not to take
the test or do anything until he (the attorney) got there.
The respondent follmved this advice.
Clearly it is apparent that one hope of delay or
waiting can he that a delay of test will show a lessor
alcoholic content in the blood. There is some testimony
that that was not a factor.
It is too broad an extension of "following advice
of his attorney" to say that he reasonably does whatever
his attorney tells him to do (whether said advice he good
or bad or correct or incorrect) under the statutes or the
law that that is "reasonable" and is not, therefore, n
"refusal to submit to a chemical test" . . . without a
reasonable cause. . ."

Such reasoning would make mockery of the very
purpose of the Im plied Consent Law and would give
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such party arrestetl a reason not to submit in every case
and in a sense, ther.efore, "put the blame on l\iame,
Boys" (i.e. the arrested parties' attorney). An attorney
then could, with impunity, advise clients in similar circumstances not to take the required test until the attorney comes to the jail whether he, in fact, did OT' not so
come; which then means the officers would have to, in
each case, wait before hooking procedures for unusual
periods of time. This would completely upset their work
schedules, they not knowing for sure whether an attorney will or will not come-all the while any measur·
able quantitati,·e test and its use or validity deminishing
to the point of non-value.
A driver on the highways of Utah is presumed to
know the law. The statutes, called the "Implied Consent Law", puts the duty on the arresting officer to
advise the party arrested of his rights. For one lawfully
arrested (and here this is not an allegation to the contrary) who thereafter refuses the chemical test or tests,
after an explanation of the consequences of such refusal; the party so arrested must determine whether to
take the test and risk evidence that could result in a
criminal com·iction or to refrain from taking the test
as required of all such drivers on our highways and risk
losing his privilege to drive an automobile for one year.
This must all be achieved within a "reasonable" time,
or without unduly delaying the officers in other duties
to be performed. The other exception by statute would
be that said arrested party did not have some "reasonable cause" for refusing to submit to the test or tests.
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This court can as readily determine the existence of a
"reasonable cause" not to submit from the evidence as·
could the trial court.
Appellant contends that the present ruling of the
trial court is in error in that, for the respondent to reasonably follow his attorney's advice and not submit to
the test within a reasonahle time (not controverted at
trial) was not a valicl excuse of failure to submit to the
test for a reasonable cause. Appellant feels the trial
court, in postulating the abm·e as excusable conduct for
respondent not to s11l1111it, is attempting to draw some
distinction wihout a difference as relates to following
his attorney's advice. This, in every case, carried to its
logical conclusion, could make the villain of the attor·
ney, not the one arrested, and the one with the duty of
decision, rather than respondent, and the results that
flow from that decision could he totally opposite from
the purpose intended by the legislature.

POINT IV
AS A :MATTER OF LA,V, A SOBRIETY
TEST SJ-IOULD BE HELD AVAILABLE
ONLY SO LONG AS THE RESULTS THERE·
FROl\I WOULD HA VE SOl\IE PROBATIV}~
VALUE.
The statute does not catagorically state that an
arresting officer shall of fer a sobriety test once and if
refused, then said refusal, regardless of place or time
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lapse is forever binding. In fact, custom and procedure
of almost all peace o_f ficers (and certainly in the instant case) is that said Implied consent rights, as well as
the invitation to take a sobriety test, are covered at the
time of arrest and at the place of proposed testing, and
at the latter place, often several times.
The statute does state, however, that the arresting
officer should be respectfull of the rights of the accused, and if the one arrested refuses, the test shall not
be given. Often it is the case that the arrested party refuses at the scene of arrest and then at the place of proposed testing, or booking into jail, after consulting legal
counsel, the person changes his mind and agrees to submit to a chemical test.
The arrested party certainly should have the right
to reconsider, to change his mind, so long as, but
0111,lJ ,'JO long as the results from the proposed test, whichever it he, are still of some probative value. The Hunter
case says a ·:reasonable time (Hunter vs. Dorius, 23
Ut.2d 122). \Vhat that reasonable time is may vary
from case to case, conditioned on facts such as: time of
arrest or accident, time of consumption of last alcoholic
beverage, time of last meal, whether blood test is proposed, breath test in proposed or a urine test, as the case
may he.
The State has a valid interest as well as the individual arrested in an objective test of the level of alcohol in a drivers bloodstream. This is true for protecting
the rights of the arrested driver, as well as for the bet-
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terment of law enforcement. The State makes these
tests available to exo11erate as well as to implicate, and
it is in the interest of hoth sides to such human drama
to make the test available so long as the results will have
probative value. JloweYer, the time comes when sufficient periods have elapsed from arrest to potential testing that the obtainable results are really of no measurable quantity and, therefore, of no value.
Whether of blood or breath or urine, that time,
unless controverted, is best established by the peace officer, technician or doctor that is qualified and is going
to administer the test.
Certainly, from the facts of this case, the peace officer felt two hours was unreasonable, he communicated
that fact to both l\Ir. liealey and his attorney on two
occasions relatively close together. They did not choose
to do other than wait and did not, at the time of triaJ,
put forth any evidence that Officer Roberts was wrong
in his value judgment as to lapsed time working the
· potential test virtually meaningless.

POINT V
ACTIONS CONSTITUTED A HEFUSAL UNDER U.C.A. 41-6-11.10 AND
OFFICER ROUERTS \VAS JUSTIFIED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE REFUSAL TO
SUBl\IIT TO CHEl\lICAL TEST (EXHIBIT
D-1) \VAS COl\iPLETED.
UESPONDE~T'S
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The Utah cases relating directly to revocation of a
driver's license for failure to submit to a test under the
statute are only these: Bean v. State, 12 Ut. 2d 76, 362,
P.:M ( l!}(il); Ringn:ood v. State, 8 Ut.2d 287, 333 P.2d
(rn:rn); lluntcr v. Dnriu.~, 23 Ut. 2d 122, 458 P.2d 877.
The first two of these cases invalidate the revocation because the officer failed to give the accused his choice of
which test of those offered under the statute he would
take. The JI untrr case is distinguishable because the
respondent was clearly given his choice and in the instant case respondent was also given his choice. (Tr. 11).
Severa] other courts have considered what action
is sufficient to constitue a "refusal" under the law. Of
course, this is primarily a factual consideration. However, in the instant case the facts indicate that the respondent was first asked to submit to a chemical test
while in the patrol car (Tr. 10). The time of such
stated in the record was some time after 2 :07 a.m. and
he fore 3 :00 a.m. The latter of which times was approximately the time they were at the .Murray City Police
Station, talking to respondent's attorney. The invitation continued open from 2 :04 a.m., until after the re·
spondent contacted his attorney there and communicated
his advised refusal not to do anything until his attorney
got there to Officer Roberts. At this point, the refusal
was completed according to the facts and Officer
Roberts was justified at that point to draft the report
of "refusal to submit to a chemical test" form. However, Officer Roberts still allowed respondent to decide
for himself by inviting him to again submit to the test.
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At 3 :20 a.m., one hour and 13 minutes after the arrest
'
the refusal form was completed.
Courts have considered that an implied refusal is
sufficient. Calciano v. llults, 13 App. Div.2d 534', 213
N.Y.S. 2d 500 (1961); Clancll v. Kelly, 7 App. Div.2d
820, 180 N.Y.S. 2d 923 (1958). The instant case is not
rested on solely the implication. The record clearly reVf'als the communication of a continued refusal for one
hour 13 minutes after the arrest occurred. There comes
a time when the utility of such a sobriety test would
become marginal. It should be apparent that the law enforcement officials should not be required to heg and
plead with a reluctant defendant for an unreasonable
length of time. The rights of an accused are hetter protected by requiring the accused to make his own decision
and not he coerced or pressured by law enforcement officials. The enforcement officials should not have their
time burdened by such potential unreasonable delays
before testing would lrnve occurre<l. The officer's judg. ment was that it would he of little or no value in one
more hour (two hours from arrest).

In Ta,71lor 't'. Kcll,11. 5 App. Div.2d mn, 171 N.Y.S.
2d 909 ( 1958) the court stated that there was clear and
direct proof of the licensee's refusal to take the blood
test. The arresting officer and arraigning justice had
both testified of the petitioner's refusal to submit to
one of the sobriety tests offered. The instant case offers similar evidence from the arresting officer, plus
a confirmation of the refusal to decide or submit to the
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test hy the officer by the respondent until such time
had elapsed as to make this particular test meaningless.
The claim that no refusal was communicated to an
officer is primarily a factual consideration that has
usually been received by courts with skepticism and most
often reflected on the basis of the facts.

POINT VI
THE HUNTER V. DOllIUS CASE DOES
NOT CONTROL AS RELATES TO THE TIME
LAPSE, TYPE OF SOI~RIETY TEST INVOLVED, OR RIGHT Olj' COUNSEL IN CIVIL
ASPECT UNDER Tl-IE 11\iPLIED CONSENT
LA,V.
Counsel for respondent says Hunter and the time
frame of llunter categorically apply, yet that case involved a blood test, not breath, and involved a consent
subsequent to refusal, followed by an arbitrary refusal
to test by the officer with no evidence apparently that
a blood test at that point would have been valueless.
It is altogether different in the case before us. The
arrested party would not say whether he would submit
until he talked to his attorney. He did talk to his attorney, not only once, but twice. The officer also talked to
the attorney told him he knew of no statute or procedure that made it a matter of law or right for the attorney to be present when the arrested party was tested.
He opinioned, when he found on inquiry that another
hour would lapse before the attorney could be at the
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l\Iurray Police Station, that was too long for testing and
that the attorney should advise his client now. I-le de-·
clined to do so. The respondent declined to submit until
his attorney was there. This is clearly a refusal under the
best interpretation of the facts of the case here; with
absolutely no showing b~· respondent that the breathalYzer lest results would still be of value in an hour beyond a :30 a.m.
The Hunter case (Hunter v. Doriu.y) 23 Utah 2d
122, should not be expanded unreasonably to cover cases
where the arrested party either eannot find his attorney;
or the arrested party voluntarily gives up trying to
contact an a ttomey; or as in this case, contacts his attorney hut suspends a decision he (Emphasis ours) must
necessarily make, within a reasonable time, until he can
see his attorney, which time may well be so far removed
from time of arrest as to invalidate any results then
obtainable by chemical test.
This case is distinguishable from the II untcr case
. in that the attorney for Dr. Hunter requested the officer to give a blood test (specified) and it was apparent·
ly still available, there was no apparent evidence that
such blood test results would not be of some value, hut
the test was refused because, apparently, at that point
the officer involved ·was somehow "irked" at the arrested party, and there was an "air" of arbitrariness,
shortness, etc., about the encounter at that point.
In the case at bar, the arrested party was amply
and numerously advised of his rights; he consulted
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counsel and followed counsel's advice and at that
moment both counsel and respondent were on notice
that respondent's failure then to decide on taking a
Breathalyzer (Emphasis added) was, in the officer's
opinion, a refusal because any results from a test possible after counsel could get to the station would be of
little or no value at all; and there was no evidence at
trial to refute this opinion. (Further, there was no real
assurance of going forward with the test after the additional hours wait). The officer was not arbitrary, out
of sorts, or impolite to the respondent, in fact, he insisted that they call ~Ir. Ables back a second time so
both woulrl clearly understand the respondent's right
and his (the respondent's) duty of decision since this
is a civil matter.
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court
in the hearing de nm·o, apparently is bottomed on the
premise that respondent had a right (Emphasis supplied) to counsel before deciding whether he would or
would not take the test. That right exists under the
"Miranda" 1 case, where the actions are criminal in
nature. There is serious doubt in many jurisdictions
that such a right to counsel exists in the civil aspects of
the Implied Consent Law where an arrested party must
decide whether or not to submit to a type of sobriety
test. illills v. Bridges, 471 P.2d 66, 93 Idaho 679; I.S.
§ 4!:>-352.; Garcia v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 456,
1.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694, 10 A.L.R.3d 97'1 (1966).
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P.2d 85.; Rust l'.'. Dil'.'ision of 1llotor V chicles, et al.,
1971, 267 C.A.2d 54;'5, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366.; Stratilws v. ·
Department of ltlotor Vehicles, (1968) 477 P.2d 237;
People v. Brown, 485 P.2d 500; Johnson v. Department
of iJlotor Vehicles, 48;5 P.2d 12.58 (Oregon 1971);
Campbell v. Superior Court in rmd For lllaricopa Coun·
t,y, 479 P.2d 685, 106 Ariz. 542; Goodman v. Orr, 1971,
97 Cal. Rptr. 226, 19 CA ard 845.
A recent Colorado case has held that Implied consent statute is not unconstitutional on grounds that it
violates right to travel upon state highways, or that it
constitute<; violation of due process by compelling citizen
to choose either his right to refuse to surrender evidence
that would help to convict him or his right to retain license to drive or by creating crime of refusing to consent to blood test punishable by forfeiture of right to
drive whlle denying fundamental rights of person
charged with criminal offense, or that it enforces warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures, or that
. it sanctions invasion of right of privacy or privilege
against self-incrimination. Const. art. 2, §§ 3, 7;
U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 4, 9; 1967 Perm.Supp.,
C.R.S., section 13-5-30 (3) et seq. People v. Brown, 485
P.2d 500.
California has numerous cases on the specific question of rights to counsel deciding such a right does not
exist as to Implied consent, this before they amended
their statutes in 1970, and codified that fact (see
sentence three, Section No. 13353 paragraph (a), Cal·

21
ifornia :Motor Vehicle Code and amended, Chapter 1103,
statutes 1970. Effective November 2, 1970.
The Implied Consent Law of California (prior to
amendment) , Idaho and Oregon all have provisions
similar to the language of Utah Section 41-6-44.10,
U .C.A. 1953, as amended, section (a). In several cases
before the courts of last impression the decisions are
unanimous that the right to counsel before a decision to
submit does not exist on the civil aspect. (See previously cited cases.)
The only varience appellant could find to this ruling
(which non-the-less pronounced the validity of such a
rule) , was in the Rust case (see Ru,st v. Division of
Motor V chicles, et al., 1971, 267 C.A.2d 545, 73
Cal.Rptr. 366) which held that while "::\Iiranda'' rights
do not apply to tlw Implied Consent Law, there may be
a factual issue that the officer did not make it clear to
the arrested party as to the differenciation between
criminal and civil rights and if that results in confusion
to the arrested party and that is not cleared up by the
officer, then there may be a question as to the arrested
party's refusal to submit.
An Oregon case on rehearing on the question of
presence of his atton1ey held that the Driver's refusal to
take a breathalyzer test without having his attorney
present was a refusal to take the test under the Implied
Consent Law, and justified suspension of his Drivers
License. (See Stratiko,fl v. Department of IJtl otor Ye•
hicles, (1968) 477 P.2d 237, adheared to and Supple-
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mental 478 P.2d ().54; also Jol111.wn ti. Department of
)..llotor Vehicles. ct al., 485 P.2d 1258.) (See also IJiills ·
t 1• Bridges, 471 P.2d G6, !.>3 Idaho 679; Ent 'l'. Department of 1llotor V chicles. 2G5 A.C.A. 1073, 71 Cal.Hptr.
726; Finley 1. 1• Orr, 2()2 .A.C.A. 711, 69 Cal.Rptr. 137.
ln the Ent and Finley cases the refusals were likewise npheld. The language in another recent California
case is supportive, (see Funl..: 'l'. Department of 11/otor
Vehicles, 1 Cal.A pp.3rd 449, 18 Cal.H ptr.
The llnnter case ,'fopra, states the plaintiff therein "still had a reasonable time in which to make up his
mind and to seek legal counsel." This was concluded
on that set of facts after counsel for the defendant
conceded that "the plaintiff had a right to consult legal
counsel before making a decision to take or decline the
test." (see lfuntcr 'l'. Darius, 2 Utah 2d 124, line 16.)
Such a right \vas not a contested issue of the Ilunter
case, it was conceded by defendant ancl not disturbed on
review by this llonorahle Court as the court felt the
· lower court ruling was supported by the evidence.
Fundamental to the issues of this case and review
thereof is the question of such a right to counsel, civil
right, under the Implied Consent Law, and the further
question of what, under these facts, was a reasonable
time for decision making and testing by respondent.
Appellant respectfully submits that such an absolute right to counsel does not exist under the Implied
Consent Law.
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POINT VII
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT REQU lRING THE REVOCATION OF THE RESPONDENT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE TO REMAIN VALID UNDER THE PRESENT
FACTS.
\Ve submit that the Judge in the trial court erred
m not requiring the revocation to remain valid under
the circumstances.
The record reveals that, though the respondent allt>ges he did not ref use the tests, (only refused to do
anything until his attorney arrived) the court agreed
that the respondent said to Officer Roberts he would
not take the test because l\lr. Ables, the attorney contacted, told him not to do so, unless he, :Mr. Ables, were
there. (Conflict of course in testimony as to whether
there at the police station to "advise" or be present as a
matter of right "for the test"). With such an admission
in the record, and finding by the court, the court erred
in demanding the license to be returned. Section 41-644.10, U.C.A., requires:
If such a person is placed under arrest and has
thereafter been requested to submit to any one
of the above chemical tests, and refuses to submit to such chemical tests, the test shall not be
given and the arresting officer shall advise the
person of his rights under this section.
'fhis is a civil statute not criminal.

24

The statute does not require the officer to invite
the accused to take the test more than once. In the in- ·
stant case, Officer Hoherts extended himself on two
occasions to allow the respondent to submit to the test
and the lower court erred in not allowing the refusal to
stand and the revocation to be complete.
A case directly on point as to the facts of this case
is the Johnson case, supra decided June 17, 1971, where
the attorney advised taking a hreathalyzer when he got
there. The Court said that any erroneous impression
upon which petitioner relied was created by his counsel,
not the police and the court reversed the trial court.
Johnson v. Department of IJ[ otor V chicles of the State
of Oregon, Appellant, 485 P.2d 1285.

CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully submits that based upon
a review of the uncontroverted facts, the trial court
erred in refusing to allow the revocation of the respon·
dent's driver's license to remain binding.
Respectfully submitted,
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